We present an experimental study where we analyze three wellknown matching mechanisms-the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms-in di¤erent informational settings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, suggesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the GaleShapley mechanisms in terms of e¢ ciency and it is slightly more successful than the Gale-Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas manipulation is stronger under the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truth-telling in lack of information about the others' payo¤s-ignorance may be bene…cial in this context-, the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others.
Introduction
There is now a vast literature on matching problems. Matching is a pervasive phenomenon arising in several economic and social settings. The assignment of civil servants to civil service positions, the admission of students to colleges, some entry-level labor markets-as the widely explored market for graduating physicians-, or the school choice problem are among the matching situations that have gained attention in the last decades. The working of some matching mechanisms, along with strategic issues that confront individuals in these contexts, have been explored theoretically under the assumption of complete information.
Very brie ‡y, in a two-sided matching market, agents belong to one of two disjoint sets, say colleges and students, and each agent-college and student-has preferences over the other side of the market-students and colleges, respectively-and the prospect of being unmatched. The matching problem then reduces to assigning students to colleges by means of a matching mechanism. Stability, strategy-proofness, and Pareto e¢ ciency of such mechanisms are highly valued properties. A mechanism is stable if it always selects stable matchings; by de…nition, under a stable matching every agent in the market prefers his partner to being alone and, moreover, no pair of agents-consisting of a college and a student-who are not matched to each other would rather prefer to be so matched. A mechanism is strategy-proof if it is immune to preference manipulation, i.e., truth is a dominant strategy. A mechanism is Pareto e¢ cient if it always selects Pareto e¢ cient matchings.
The perhaps most famous matching mechanism relies on the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962 ). Gale and Shapley were motivated by the problem of the admission of students to colleges and the Gale-Shapley algorithm was written as a means to show that a stable matching always exists in such a two-sided matching market. The Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm transforms a matching where all agents are unmatched into a stable matching, thus proving existence. Besides guaranteeing stability, the Gale-Shapley (GS) mechanism has other appealing properties. Namely, truth is a dominant strategy for one side of the market (Dubins and Freedman, 1981, Roth, 1982a) . Moreover, it is Pareto e¢ cient when the welfare of both sides of the market is considered (Roth, 1982a) .
Most theoretical studies on matching mechanisms rely on the assumption of complete information, however implausible: knowing the true preferences of every agent in the market is more than we may reasonably expect in most matching markets. Only a few papers have relaxed this assumption and are thus worth mentioning. Roth (1989) is a …rst attempt to deal with the incom-plete information case. Under incomplete information, even though truth remains a dominant strategy for one side of the market when the Gale-Shapley mechanism is employed, the equilibrium characterization for the complete information case is not robust. Ehlers and Massó (2003) study Bayesian Nash equilibria for mechanisms producing stable matchings-as the Gale-Shapley mechanism-and …nd a necessary and su¢ cient condition for truth-telling to be an equilibrium: truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the revelation game induced by a stable mechanism and a common belief if and only if all pro…les in its support have a singleton core. Finally, Roth and Rothblum (1999) and Ehlers (2003 Ehlers ( , 2004 are less ambitious and do not aim at characterizing equilibria, but give advice to individuals on how to participate in matching markets when there is uncertainty about the others'strategies.
Still, many questions regarding the strategic incentives agents face under incomplete information remain to be answered on theoretical grounds. How the amount of information held by individuals on the elements of the game actually in ‡uences individuals' decision making, a¤ecting the performance of matching mechanisms, is thus a question to be explored. For instance, Barberà and Dutta (1995) consider truth-telling as a form of "protective" behavior, claiming that risk averse agents may revert to faithfully revealing their true preferences when they are poorly informed. Moreover, it is clear that in mechanisms for which truth is not a dominant strategy, computing the optimal strategies requires a lot of information on others'preferences. In this paper we present an experimental study to investigate these and other issues, providing a direction into which the role of information on decision making may be ascertained.
We investigate a particular class of matching problems: the assignment of individuals to indivisible items. In these problems, individuals-let us call them teachers-have strict preferences over the indivisible items-henceforth, schools-and, on the other hand, schools have a maximum capacity and a strict priority ordering of all teachers. This problem has been referred to as the school choice problem (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) and is closely related to the college admissions problem explored by Gale and Shapley (Gale and Shapley, 1962) , the main di¤erence being that, in contrast to the college admissions model, here schools are not strategic agents, but mere objects to be assigned to teachers. Hence, while teachers may not straightforwardly reveal their true preferences, schools have no chance of manipulating priorities.
The in ‡uence of information is assessed for the GS mechanism and for another well-known matching mechanism, the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, as well as for the Boston mechanism, which has been widely used in the context of school choice problems. 1 The TTC (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) ful…lls two appealing properties-it is both strategy-proof (Roth, 1982b) and Pareto e¢ cient-but it is not stable. The GS mechanism is both strategy-proof and stable, but not e¢ cient (Roth, 1982a ), since we only consider teachers'welfare in this setup. Finally, we have included the Boston mechanism for reference, as it fails to meet all three properties: it is not strategy-proof, neither stable, nor Pareto e¢ cient. Note that, whereas the GS mechanism fails to be e¢ cient even when agents act straightforwardly, under the Boston mechanism e¢ ciency losses result from the fact that there is room for pro…table manipulation and Pareto e¢ ciency would result if agents revealed their true preferences. 2 Besides providing yet another test of theoretical results on matching mechanisms with boundedly rational individuals, we address two main questions. First, we compare the three above mentioned mechanisms under four informational scenarios, ranging from complete ignorance about the other participants' preferences and schools' priorities to complete information on all elements of the game. In particular, we are concerned in comparing the incentives agents face under di¤erent mechanisms, as well as in comparing e¢ ciency levels and stability of the outcomes, for di¤erent information levels. These comparisons may have important policy implications. The results in this paper suggest that, just as predicted by theory, the TTC mechanism prevails over the GS in what e¢ ciency is concerned. Moreover, when agents hold very little or full information on the elements of the game, the TTC may be more successful than the GS in inducing truth-telling. On the other hand, the Boston mechanism performs surprisingly well, delivering an exceptionally high proportion of stable matchings and e¢ ciency levels that are close to those obtained under any of the two alternative mechanisms. Second, within each mechanism, we evaluate the in ‡uence of the amount of information held by individuals on decision making. Namely, we are concerned in testing whether truth-telling emerges as a very salient form of behavior when information is low. Moreover, if we are able to determine that information signi…cantly a¤ects individuals'behavior, we can immediately conclude that the existing theoretical results, which rely on the fundamental assumption 1 School choice programs have become increasingly popular in the US. The best known of these programs rely on the so-called Boston mechanism, which was used to assign students to schools in Boston, having been recently replaced by a mechanism based on Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm. The Boston mechanism remains in use in Cambridge and Seattle, among others. 2 On the functioning and strategic properties of the Boston mechanism, check Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez of complete information, are insu¢ cient to deal with markets where agents know little about others. Otherwise, if the e¤ect of information is not relevant, theory may be considered apt to deal with the incomplete information case. Our results partially support the …rst conjecture: in general, there is a large di¤erence between scenarios where information levels are extremely low and those where agents hold substantial levels of information, while the differences between partial and full information scenarios are not signi…cant. In particular, in a very low information environment, acting straightforwardly is a very salient form of behavior and there is a signi…cant drop in the proportion of agents who play truthfully once agents have some information on the elements of the game. Furthermore, in low information environments, signi…cantly higher levels of e¢ ciency are achieved under every mechanism except for TTC, which appears to be less sensitive to the amount of information held by participants. Finally, our results do not disclose a signi…cant e¤ect of information on the proportion of stable matchings achieved under any of the mechanisms under study.
We are aware of several experimental studies of matching problems, some of which aim at testing the above mentioned mechanisms. The main di¤erence with respect to this paper derives from our main objective: to test the role of information in evaluating matching mechanisms. These studies include Harrison and McCabe (1996) that explores the GS mechanism and shows that pro…table manipulation of agents' preferences becomes more di¢ cult as markets get larger; Chen and Sönmez (2002a) that compares a random serial dictatorship mechanism used to allocate dormitory rooms in American universities with a variant of the TTC in an incomplete information environment, concluding that the TTC produces signi…cantly more e¢ cient allocations; in a companion paper, Chen and Sönmez (2002b) evaluate the performance of these mechanisms under complete information, reaching the same qualitative results. Finally, Chen and Sönmez (2006) , consider the school choice problem and analyze the TTC, the GS, and the Boston mechanisms under incomplete information, concluding that, in what e¢ ciency is concerned, the TTC outperforms the Boston mechanism and in turn the GS improves upon the TTC. This e¢ ciency reversal result contrasts with the results obtained in this paper. Other experimental studies, dealing with other matching mechanisms, are: Olson and Porter (1994), Nalbantian and Schotter (1995), Kagel and Roth (2000) , Ünver (2001) , Haruvy, Roth, and Ünver (2001) , and McKinney, Niederle, and .
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical properties of the three matching mechanisms under study. We describe the experimental design in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes the main results of the experiments. Some concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
The Theoretical Model
We …rst introduce the model and then describe the three matching mechanisms and their theoretical properties.
In this assignment problem there are a number of teachers to …ll a number of vacancies or teaching positions across di¤erent schools. Each teacher has strict preferences over all schools, while each school has a strict priority ranking of all teachers, as well as a maximum number of teachers to employ. Priorities are exogenous and not subject to manipulation by schools. The fact that only teachers can act strategically is what distinguishes this problem from the college admissions model. It is not di¢ cult to justify the use of the school choice model. Besides the fact that this model is easier to be implemented in the laboratory, we can …nd plenty of real-life situations that can be described as one side of the market being inactive. We have already mentioned the use of the school choice problem in the admission of children to public schools in the US, which also applies to other countries as Spain, but we can also think about the admission of students to universities (which is, in most countries, based on students'grades), the MIR system ("Médicos Internos Residentes," a residence training system for physicians in public hospitals based on their performance) in Spain, or in general the assignment of civil servants to civil service positions (for example, teachers, judges, or tax inspectors in Spain), which is, in several countries, based on an objective scoring system.
The outcome of the school choice problem is a matching, an assignment of teachers to teaching positions such that each teacher is assigned one vacancy and each vacancy is …lled by one teacher only. A matching is Pareto e¢ cient if there is no matching that assigns at least one teacher a strictly better school and every other teacher a weakly better school, and it is stable if every agent in the market prefers his partner to being alone and, moreover, no pair of agents-consisting of a school and a teacher-who are not matched to each other would rather prefer to be so matched. A matching mechanism consists of a systematic procedure that selects a matching for each school choice problem. A matching mechanism is e¢ cient if it always chooses Pareto e¢ cient matchings; it is stable if it always selects stable matchings; and it is strategy-proof if truth is a dominant strategy, i.e., no teacher can pro…tably manipulate her preferences, independently of the other agents'strategies.
The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
In this context, the TTC works as follows:
1. Each school gives priority to a number of teachers up to its capacity; in this setting, for simplicity, each teacher has priority in one school only.
2. Each teacher reports her preferences over the schools.
3. An ordering of teachers is randomly chosen.
4. For any submitted teachers'preferences, schools'priorities, and ordering of teachers, the outcome is obtained after undergoing the following steps:
(a) Assign each teacher to a school (tentative assignment); in this setting, each teacher is tentatively assigned to her priority school.
(b) The …rst teacher in the ordering proposes to her top ranked school. If she has priority at this school, the assignment is …nalized and both the teacher and teaching position are removed from the system; the procedure continues with the second teacher in the ordering. Otherwise, the …rst teacher in the ordering that is tentatively assigned to the proposed school is inserted at the top of the ordering, in front of the requester.
(c) When the ordering is modi…ed, this procedure is repeated, so that the teacher who just became …rst in the ordering sends an application to her highest-ranked school. If she has priority at this school, the assignment is …nalized and the procedure continues with the next teacher in line. Otherwise, the …rst teacher in the ordering tentatively assigned to the proposed school is inserted at the top of the ordering, in front of the requester.
(d) If a cycle forms, it consists of a sequence of proposals of the kind: A proposes to B's tentative assignment, B applies to C's tentative assignment, and C proposes to A's tentative assignment. In such cases, all teachers in the cycle are assigned to the schools they proposed to and teachers, as well as their respective assignments, are removed from the system.
(e) The procedure stops when all teachers are assigned to a position.
The TTC mechanism satis…es two appealing properties: it is strategyproof, i.e., truth is a dominant strategy for every teacher, and Pareto e¢ cient, but it is not stable. 3 We thus expect that individuals reveal their preferences in a straightforward manner, independently of the amount of information they hold on the elements of the game. 4 As a result, we expect to observe a high e¢ ciency level but not necessarily a high frequency of stable outcomes.
The Gale-Shapley Mechanism
The GS mechanism is certainly one of the best known mechanisms in the matching literature. Its theoretical properties and the incentives it gives to agents have been scrutinized and its applications encompass a signi…cant number of markets. In what follows we describe the functioning of the GS mechanism:
1. A priority ordering of teachers is determined for each school.
3. Given the submitted preferences of the teachers and schools' priority orderings, positions are allocated after undergoing the following steps:
(a) Each teacher proposes to her …rst ranked school. Each school keeps the applicants with higher priority order on hold until positions are …lled, while rejecting the lowest priority teachers in excess of its capacity.
(b) In general:
Every teacher who got rejected in the previous step proposes to the next school on her list of preferences. Each school considers the teachers it holds from the previous step together with the new applications. The lowest priority teachers in excess of the school's capacity are rejected, while remaining applications are kept on hold.
(c) This process is repeated until no applications are rejected. Each participant is then assigned the position at the school that keeps her on hold.
As the TTC mechanism, the GS mechanism is strategy-proof. Again, we expect individuals to faithfully reveal their true preferences over schools in every informational treatment. 5 This mechanism is e¢ cient when the welfare of both sides of the market is taken into account. Nevertheless, in this assignment problem, schools are mere objects to be allocated among teachers and only teachers'welfare is taken into consideration in the determination of the e¢ ciency level. Since there may exist a matching that Pareto dominates the outcome of the GS mechanism for teachers, the mechanism is not e¢ cient in this setup. It follows that, if theory is to be con…rmed, the TTC should outperform the GS in e¢ ciency terms. On the other hand, when considering stability, theory predicts that the occurrence of stable matchings under the GS mechanism should be more frequent than under either the TTC or the Boston mechanisms.
The Boston Mechanism
The Boston mechanism has been the most widely used assignment mechanism in real-life applications of school choice problems. It works as follows:
3. Given the submitted preferences of the teachers and schools' priority orderings, positions are allocated after several rounds:
(a) Each teacher proposes to her top ranked school. Each school accepts the proposals from the teachers with higher priority order until positions are …lled (or no teachers proposing to the school remain). These applicants and their positions are removed from the system. All other applications are rejected by the schools.
(b) In general at round k:
Each teacher remaining in the system proposes to its k th school. Each school with vacant positions accepts the proposals from the teachers with higher priority order until positions are …lled (or no teachers proposing to the school remain in this round). These applicants and their positions are removed from the system. All other applications are rejected by the schools.
(c) The procedure terminates when each teacher is assigned a position. 6 A major handicap of the Boston mechanism is that it leads to preference manipulation. 7 In fact, teachers are given incentives to rank high on their submitted preferences the schools where they have good chances of getting in. This has two important consequences. First, evaluating the performance of this mechanism according to the revealed preferences is clearly inadequate. Moreover, even though the outcome of the Boston mechanism is Pareto ef…cient when teachers submit their true preferences, preference manipulation may lead to a substantial e¢ ciency loss. Hence, we expect high rates of preference manipulation and a low level of achieved e¢ ciency. Moreover, as the mechanism is not stable, the GS mechanism should outperform the Boston mechanism in this aspect as well.
Experimental Design
These experiments were designed to analyze participants' decision making in di¤erent informational settings under each of the above described matching mechanisms: the Boston, the GS, and the TTC mechanisms. We use a 3x4 design: for each mechanism we construct four treatments di¤ering in the amount of information held by participants about the elements of the game. We then compare decision making throughout the treatments, concentrating on the role of information in truthful preference revelation, in the achieved level of e¢ ciency, and in stability. The environment is designed to capture the key aspects and di¢ culties of each mechanism, under a controlled environment, with relatively small groups of participants.
Participants were randomly and anonymously sorted into groups of …ve. Each participant plays the role of a teacher to be assigned to a teaching position. For each group of …ve teachers, there are …ve vacancies-or teaching positions-across three schools that di¤er in capacity (number of opening positions) and desirability. Each position should be assigned to one teacher only. Preferences over schools are induced by the monetary payo¤ a teacher obtains depending on the school where she …lls a vacancy at the end of the experiment. The payo¤s obtained are symmetric: every teacher gets 15 experimental currency units (ECU) for her top choice, 9 ECU for the second choice, and 3 ECU for the last choice, but di¤erent teachers need not agree on which school is either her top, second, or last choice. In the experiment, 1 ECU equals 0.5 Euro. The payo¤s of di¤erent outcomes are su¢ ciently dispersed so as to have a monetarily salient di¤erence (12 ECU, which equals 6 Euro) between getting one's best and one's worst choice.
Finally, schools have priorities over teachers. This means that schools may prefer some applicants to others and are able to rank all the participants in a list of priorities. Moreover, as the priorities of the schools are given, schools are not real strategic agents (i.e., they "play" truthfully) and all the participants know this.
Informational Settings
In each experimental session one of the di¤erent informational treatments is implemented for one of the three mechanisms. The four informational settings are the following:
Zero information setting: Each participant knows her possible payo¤ amounts depending on the school where she holds a position (i.e., her own induced preferences), but not the other participants' preferences. She is only told that di¤erent participants might have di¤erent payo¤ tables. Participants have no information about the schools' priority ordering in this treatment. They are only told each school's capacity (i.e., its number of vacancies).
Low information setting: Besides her own induced preferences and the capacity of each school, each participant knows for which school she is the favorite candidate.
Partial information setting: Each participant knows her own induced preferences, capacities, and the favorite candidates of all schools, up to their capacities.
Full information setting: Each participant has complete information on both the induced preferences of all participants and the full priority ordering of schools over candidates.
In the case of the TTC mechanism, as the schools'priority orderings are re ‡ected in the tentative assignments, under the low information treatment each participant is told-besides her own induced preferences and schools' capacities-her own tentative assignment, while in the partial information treatment each participant is aware of all the participants'tentative assignments and in the full information treatment she also knows the induced preferences of all the participants.
We conducted 12 sessions with undergraduate students from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, recruited via e-mail using the web-based online recruitment system for Economic Experiments (ORSEE, Greiner, 2004) , where the experimental sessions (on paper/by hand) took place. In total, 435 subjects have participated in the experiment. Each treatment was implemented in a di¤erent session, therefore each subject was allowed to participate in one session only. In each session we had 45 subjects (9 groups) participating, except for the session where treatment B0 was implemented, where only 30 subjects (6 groups) participated. Subjects were informed that they would participate in a decision making task. At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly seated at the tables and printed instructions were given to them. Once everybody was seated, instructions were read aloud and questions were answered privately. In each session subjects were asked to submit a school ordering, from their top to their last choice. Once everybody made her decision and the answer sheets were collected, subjects were asked to recall their submitted ordering and give a brief explanation of why they chose the given ranking. 8 In the meanwhile, each participant's …nal matching was determined and …nally earnings were paid. Sessions lasted about 45-60 minutes and average net payments-including a 2 Euro show-up fee-were around 7,5 Euro.
The instructions and Decision Sheets in English for the GS mechanism can be found in the Appendix. 9 
Experimental Results
In this section we present our experimental results. Our aim is to analyze how the level of information participants hold a¤ects the decision making process and consequently the properties of the three matching mechanisms. The …rst keypoint is related to whether individuals report their preferences truthfully. We investigate whether the amount of information given to participants in ‡u-ences the rate of truthful preference revelation (keeping the mechanism under analysis …xed) and, additionally, whether under the same informational setting truth-telling changes with the implemented mechanism. Second, given the reported preferences, we compare e¢ ciency levels under each mechanism across informational settings, as well as across mechanisms for each information level. Finally, we examine the performance of each mechanism and the in ‡uence of the amount of information on the proportion of stable outcomes 8 Subjects were not informed about this additional task in advance not to interfere with their decisions. On the other hand, this additional task was not compulsory (even though around 90% of the participants decided to do it). 9 The instructions for the other mechanisms only di¤er in the description of the allocation method. The Decision Sheets for players in di¤erent roles look similar to the ones shown in the Appendix. obtained. The proportion of players who played truthfully varies between 46,7% and 95,6%, depending on the treatment being implemented. Note that, even though the GS and the TTC mechanisms are strategy-proof, there is some misrepresentation of preferences under these mechanisms. It is thus important to examine who manipulates the preferences and in which manner. Based on the explanations given by the subjects, we have identi…ed three possible ways of preference manipulation. First, a substantial proportion of the participants has ranked the school where they have priority higher in the submitted ranking than it would be according to the induced preferences; this is what we call the "Priority School Bias" (PSB). 10 The second identi…ed way of manipulating the true preferences is to underrank the most competitive school (i.e., the school with only one vacancy); following Chen and Sönmez (2006) we name this form of behavior "Small School Bias" (SSB). The third manipulation method (PSB&SSB) is simply the simultaneous use of both previously described ways. 11 We can see that a relatively small proportion of the participants used the SSB method, although when comparing the average net payo¤ of the subjects who manipulate their preferences, we …nd that it yields a higher payo¤ (11 ECU) than the other two methods. The average payo¤s obtained with the PSB and the PSB&SSB methods (8,7 ECU and 8,5 ECU respectively) suggest that these methods are used as means to ensure their second best payo¤ (9 ECU). This form of behavior can be considered as a kind of risk aversion, since it allows the participants to avoid their worst payo¤ (3 ECU). Our data also shows that preference manipulation yields higher payo¤s under the Boston mechanism (9,9 ECU) than under any of the other two, strategy-proof, mechanisms (8, 5 ECU) . In order to analyze whether the quantity of information participants hold a¤ects behavior, we compare the proportion of participants playing truthfully in di¤erent informational settings under each mechanism.
Truthful Preference Revelation
Result 1: Under each mechanism, having no information about the other parties'preferences results in a signi…cantly higher proportion of subjects revealing their true preferences than having some additional information, while there is no statistically signi…cant di¤erence among the treatments where agents hold low, partial, and full information. Statistical evidence. Under each mechanism, the null hypothesis of equal proportions of truthful preference revelation across the four informational settings can be rejected at the 5% signi…cance level. As the null hypotheses are rejected, multiple comparisons are made. Some di¤erences in the proportion of truth-telling across information settings and the p-values of the signi…cance t-tests of di¤erences can be found in Table 2 . For conciseness, we omit all tests involving the low information treatment, noting that the values obtained are very close to those of the partial information treatment.
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Mechanism
B0-B1
B0-B2 B2-B1 GS0-GS1 GS0-GS2 GS1-GS2 TTC0-TTC1 TTC0-TTC2 TTC2-TTC1 
Boston
GS TTC
Result 2: Across mechanisms there is a signi…cant di¤erence in the proportion of truth-telling. In particular, in the zero and the full information settings, the TTC mechanism performs better than the GS and Boston mechanisms and, in the low, partial, and full information settings, the proportion of truth-telling under both GS or TTC is higher than under the Boston mechanism.
Statistical evidence. Under each informational settings, the null hypothesis of equal proportions of truthful preference revelation across the three matching mechanisms can be rejected at the 5% signi…cance level. As the null hypotheses are rejected, multiple comparisons are made. Some di¤er-ences in the proportion of truth-telling across mechanisms and the p-values of the signi…cance t-tests of di¤erences can be found in Table 3. 13 Info B0-GS0 TTC0-B0 TTC0-GS0 GS1-B1 TTC1-B1 TTC1-GS1 GS2-B2 TTC2-B2 TTC2-GS2 To summarize our results regarding truth-telling, in lack of any information about the other participants' payo¤s and preferences agents are much more likely to revert to truth-telling. This suggests that complete ignorance can be very convenient in this setting. Still, this does not make the TTC any less desirable: even under complete ignorance, the TTC mechanism outperforms the GS mechanism, which in turn results as successful as the Boston mechanism in what playing truthfully is concerned. In the settings where agents have additional information about the elements of the game, the TTC mechanism performs clearly better in revealing preferences straightforwardly than the Boston mechanism, and at least as well as the GS mechanism.
E¢ ciency
We now investigate mechanism e¢ ciency in the di¤erent information scenarios. As we know, there is a strong link between preference manipulation and e¢ ciency: even when the mechanism used is Pareto e¢ cient-in terms of the revealed preferences-strategic behavior may lead to ine¢ cient allocations.
In calculating e¢ ciency levels we use the following de…nitions. The e¢ -ciency of a group of participants is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the actual earnings of the members of the group and the Pareto-optimal earnings of the group. The e¢ ciency of a treatment is simply the average of the e¢ ciency of all the groups. Our …rst question regarding e¢ ciency is whether some informational settings yield higher e¢ ciency levels than others. After this, we will turn our attention to the e¢ ciency di¤erences that may arise as a result of the di¤erent characteristics of the implemented mechanisms.
Result 3: Under the Boston and GS mechanisms the amount of information has a signi…cant e¤ect on the average e¢ ciency achieved by participants, while under the TTC mechanism average e¢ ciency does not depend on the implemented information setting. In particular, under the Boston and GS mechanisms, having either no or a low level of information about the other parties' preferences results in a signi…cantly higher average e¢ ciency than when participants hold partial information. On the other hand, there is no signi…cant di¤erence in the e¢ ciency achieved under any mechanism between the partial and full information treatments. Statistical evidence. The pairwise di¤erences in average e¢ ciency across information settings and the p-values of the signi…cance (permutation) tests of di¤erences can be found in Table 5:   14   Mechanism   B0-B1  B0-B2  B2-B1 GS0-GS1 GS0-GS2 GS2-GS1 TTC0-TTC1 TTC0-TTC2 TTC2- 
Boston
GS TTC
Under the TTC mechanism the null hypothesis of equal average e¢ ciency across information settings can not be rejected. So, in this case-although there is a signi…cant di¤erence in the truthful preference revelation when comparing truthfulness between the zero and the partial information settingsthere is no signi…cant di¤erence in the average e¢ ciency of the four treatments at any reasonable signi…cance level.
Result 4:
In the partial and in the full information treatments, the average e¢ ciency under the TTC mechanism is signi…cantly higher than under any of the other mechanisms. On the other hand, there is no signi…cant difference in average e¢ ciency between the mechanisms in either the zero or low information settings.
Statistical evidence. Table 6 shows the di¤erences in average e¢ ciency across mechanisms and the p-values of the signi…cance (permutation) tests of di¤erences. Table 6 : Difference in the proportion of average efficiency across mechanisms and p -values of the significance (permutation) tests of differences
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B0-GS0 TTC0-B0 TTC0-GS0 B1-GS1 TTC1-B1 TTC1-GS1 B2-GS2 TTC2-B2 TTC2-GS2
Partial Zero
Another way to evaluate the performance of a mechanism is to consider the proportion of participants who obtain their top choices. For this purpose, it might be tempting to use the reported preferences, so that a high fraction of participants receiving their submitted top choice would suggest that the mechanism performs well. 16 However, as we have seen above, a substantial proportion of participants manipulate their preferences, so that in order to get a more accurate depiction of the performance of each mechanism in each information setting, it is worth to examine the proportion of participants who get their true top choices.
Result 5a: Under the Boston and the GS mechanisms, in the low, partial, and full information settings, there is a highly signi…cant di¤erence between the proportion of participants who receive their reported top choice and those who receive their true top choice. Under the TTC this di¤erence is only signi…cant in the low and partial information setting. Statistical evidence. Table 7 shows the di¤erence between the proportion of subjects who got assigned their reported top choice and of those who actually got their true top choice, as well as the corresponding p-values of the t-tests of proportions. While in the zero information setting there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the proportion of subjects who get their reported top choices and the ones who get their true top choices, in the low, partial, and full information settings, under the Boston and the GS mechanisms, the null hypothesis of equal proportions can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of the percentage of reported top choices being higher than the percentage of true top choices. Under the TTC mechanism, the same null can be rejected in the low and partial information settings.
Mechanism
Result 5b: The amount of information has an important e¤ect on the proportion of subjects who receive their true top choices. In particular, under the Boston and the GS mechanisms, a signi…cantly higher number of participants get their true top choices in the zero information treatment than when holding some information on the elements of the game. The TTC mechanism is not sensitive to the amount of information and prevails over GS in what the assignment of the true top choices is considered. Statistical evidence. Table 8 reports the di¤erences in the proportion of subjects who receive their true top choices across information settings (upper half) and across mechanisms (lower half), as well as the corresponding p-values of the signi…cance t-tests for di¤erences. B0-B2  B2-B1 GS0-GS1 GS0-GS2 GS2-GS1 TTC0-TTC1 TTC0-TTC2 TTC2- The above results indicate that the TTC is more e¢ cient than both the GS and the Boston mechanisms, which con…rms theory and contrasts with the e¢ ciency reversal result obtained in Chen and Sönmez (2006) . In fact, while in Chen and Sönmez (2006) a substantial proportion of agents manipulate their preferences under TTC and, as a consequence, the GS emerges as more e¢ cient, in this experiment many participants have recognized the strategy of truth-telling as dominant under TTC, leading to comparable rates of manipulation under both mechanisms. Another advantage of the TTC mechanism unveiled above is that the proportion of subjects who get their true top choice under the TTC is signi…cantly higher than under the GS mechanism. On the other hand, e¢ ciency levels and the fraction of subjects obtaining their true top choices under the TTC appear to be less dependent on the level of information participants hold, when compared to what is achieved under either Boston or GS. Finally, the Boston mechanism is more e¢ cient than we could reasonably expect; this is due to the fact that a relatively high number of participants reveal their true preferences under this mechanism.
B0-B1
Stability
In what stability is concerned, a couple of remarks is in order. First, recall that the GS mechanism generates outcomes that are stable with respect to the submitted preferences, while neither the Boston nor the TTC mechanisms ful…l this property. Second, the stability of an outcome is evaluated for the true preferences of the participants and schools' priorities. 17 Last, the average stability of a treatment is calculated simply as the proportion of stable outcomes observed among all the realized matchings in that treatment.
Our experimental data regarding the average stability of the treatments is shown in Table 9 . 
Mechanism
Boston
GS TTC
An interesting feature of our results on stability is that although we could expect the GS mechanism to yield the teachers' optimal outcome, in the partial information setting, 71% of the stable matchings turn out to be the 17 The set of stable matchings is composed of the following outcomes: teachers 1 and 2 assigned to school B, 3 assigned to C, and 4 and 5 to A (the teachers' optimal stable matching); teacher 1 matched to B, 2 to A, 3 to C, 4 to A, and 5 to B; and …nally 1 assigned to B, 2 to A, 3 to B, 4 to A, and 5 to C (the schools'optimal stable matching). schools' optimal stable matching. This can be explained on account of the substantial rate of manipulation under this treatment. Still, the theoretical stability ranking between GS and TTC appears to hold empirically, as stated in the following result.
Result 6: The amount of information has no signi…cant e¤ect on the proportion of stable outcomes under any of the mechanisms. On the other hand, the GS mechanism results to be more successful than the TTC mechanism, but it only performs signi…cantly better than the Boston mechanism in the partial informational scenario. Proof. Table 10 reports the di¤erences in the proportion of stable matchings across informational treatments (upper half) and across mechanisms (lower half) and the p-values of the signi…cance (Fisher's exact) tests of di¤erences.
Mechanism
B0-B1
B2-B0 B2-B1 GS1-GS0 GS0-GS2 GS1-GS2 TTC1-TTC0 TTC0-TTC2 TTC1-TTC2 Difference 5,6% 27,8% 33,3% 22,2% 11,1% 33,3% 11,1% 0,0% 11,1%
Info setting 
GS0-B0 B0-TTC0GS0-TTC0 GS1-B1 TTC1-B1 GS1-TTC1 B2-GS2 B2-TTC2 GS2-TTC2
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examine a particular class of matching problems that is closely related to the college admissions problem: the assignment of individuals to indivisible items. We analyze three well-known matching mechanismsthe Boston, the GS, and the TTC mechanisms-under di¤erent informational settings. Our experimental design allows us to explore two main questions. First, we compare individuals' decision making regarding truth-telling, e¢ ciency, and stability across the three mechanisms, in each informational setting. These results may serve as a test of the theoretical characterization of the above mechanisms. Our results show that in both the zero and full information settings, under the TTC mechanism, a signi…cantly higher proportion of participants plays truthfully than under either the Boston or the GS mechanisms. In case the participants have some information about the elements of the game, under the Boston mechanism a signi…cantly higher number of participants manipulate their preferences than under either the GS or the TTC mechanisms. 18 That under complete ignorance we do not …nd a signi…cant di¤erence in truth-telling between the Boston and the GS mechanisms is specially interesting as under the latter mechanism straightforward behavior is dominant. Regarding e¢ ciency, the experimental results are in accordance with the predictions of the theory in the partial and full information settings: here the TTC mechanism yields a signi…cantly higher e¢ ciency level than either the Boston or the GS mechanisms. On the other hand, when participants have low information about the others'preferences, there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the achieved e¢ ciency across mechanisms. 19 As for stability, the theoretical superiority of the GS mechanism is only con…rmed in the partial information treatment. In low information treatments, even though the GS performs better than the TTC mechanism, it is as successful as the Boston mechanism, while under complete information there is no di¤erence between the three mechanisms in what the proportion of stable outcomes is concerned. 20 Our second aim is to evaluate the in ‡uence of the amount of information held by individuals on the decision making process under the three matching mechanisms. The experimental results show that if participants have no information about the others' preferences they are more likely to play truthfully than when holding some information, while there is no signi…cant di¤erence in truth-telling under any of the mechanisms among settings where agents hold some information. 21 The amount of information plays a role in the achieved e¢ ciency level as well. Under the Boston and the GS mechanisms participants reach higher e¢ ciency levels in low information settings than when holding partial information. While under the Boston mechanism the e¢ ciency in the zero information setting is signi…cantly higher than in the full information setting, the same di¤erence under the GS mechanism is not signi…cant. Under any of these two mechanisms, there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the partial and the full information case. On the other hand, under the TTC mechanism, the amount of information does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the achieved e¢ ciency level. 22 Finally, in what stability 18 Summarizing, the comparison of the proportions of truthtelling across mechanisms is the following: B0=GS0<TTC0; B0.5<GS0.5=TTC0.5; B1<GS1=TTC1; B2<GS2<TTC2. 19 Summarizing, the e¢ ciency levels across mechanisms are the following: B0=GS0=TTC0; B0.5=GS0.5=TTC0.5; TTC1>B1=GS1; TTC2>B2=GS2. 20 Summarizing, the results of stability across mechanisms are the following: GS0>TTC0, GS0=B0, B0=TTC0; GS0.5=B0.5=TTC0.5; GS1>B1=TTC1; GS2=B2=TTC2. 21 Summarizing, the proportion of truthtelling across informational settings is the following: B0>B0.5=B1=B2; GS0>GS1=GS2, GS0=GS0.5, and GS0.5=GS1; TTC0=TTC0.5, TTC0>TTC1, TTC0=TTC2, and TTC0.5=TTC1=TTC2. 22 Summarizing, the e¢ ciency levels across informational settings are the following:
is concerned, the information does not determine the proportion of stable outcomes. 23 Summarizing, we can conclude that the comparison of the mechanisms points to the superiority of the TTC mechanism. Although regarding truthful preference revelation-depending on the implemented informational settingit may give similar results to the GS mechanism, in the achieved e¢ ciency level the TTC mechanism performs clearly better than either the Boston or the GS mechanisms. Moreover, we …nd that the amount of information may play a role in participants'decision making. In general we can say that if the participants only know their own induced preferences, i.e., own payo¤s, they are more likely to play truthfully than in case of having additional information. This results also in higher e¢ ciency levels under all mechanisms, except for the TTC, where the amount of information has no signi…cant e¤ect on the achieved e¢ ciency. Complete ignorance may thus be very convenient in this context. You and every other participant play the role of a teacher and have to indicate a preference ordering over schools. We will form groups of …ve participants, so that you will be grouped with 4 other participants, whose identity you will not know. There are 3 schools (A, B, and C) and 5 teaching positions available across them: two positions at schools A and B, and one position at school C. Each of the …ve positions will be allocated to a participant, based on the preference orderings submitted by the 5 participants of the group. Besides di¤ering in size (number of teaching positions), schools di¤er in location and quality. The desirability of schools in terms of location and quality is summarized in the amounts shown in the payo¤ table (see Decision Sheets), which contains the payo¤ amounts in experimental currency units (ECU) corresponding to each participant and school position. This matrix is known by all the participants.
Submitted school ranking: During the experiment you will be asked to complete the Decision Sheet by indicating the preference ordering over schools you wish to submit. You have to rank every school. Once all participants have completed their Decision Sheets, the experiment is …nished.
Priority ordering of schools: Schools when o¤ering positions consider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have. On this basis, they build a priority ordering where all candidates are ranked. The following Payo¤s: During the session you can earn money. You will receive 4 ECU for your participation, in addition to the amount you earn in the experiment. This amount is displayed in the payo¤ matrix, corresponding to the position you hold at the end of the session. Note that the position you hold at the end of the experiment depends on your submitted ordering and the submitted ordering of the other participants of your group (which you do not know at the moment of submitting your order).
Once the experiment has …nished and the allocations of the participants are determined, each participant will get paid her total payo¤ in euros. One ECU equals 0,5 Euros.
Allocation Method: With this method, each participant is assigned a position at the best possible school reported in her Decision Sheet that is consistent with the priority ordering of schools. Given the submitted preferences of the participants and the priority ordering of each school, positions are allocated in the following way:
An application to the …rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is sent for each participant.
Each school accepts the applicants with higher priority order until positions are …lled, and keep them on hold, while rejects the lowest priority students in excess of its capacity. Throughout the allocation process, a school can hold no more applications than its number of positions! Whenever an applicant is rejected at a school, an application is sent to the next highest school on his Decision Sheet.
Whenever a school receives a new application (from an applicant that has been rejected in a previous round by a better ranked school), these applications are considered together with the (previously) retained applications for that school. Among the retained and new applicants, the lowest priority ones in excess of the number of the positions are rejected, while remaining applications are retained.
This process is repeated until no more applications can be rejected, and the allocation is …nalized; and each participant is assigned the position at the school that holds her application at the end of the process.
An Example: We will go through a simple example to illustrate how the allocation method works.
Applicants and schools: In this example there are four applicants (1 -4) and three schools (A, B, C).
Positions: There are two positions at school B, and one each at A and C. Submitted school ranking: Suppose the submitted school rankings of each participant are the following: -School C rejects Applicant 4, as it only has one position, and School C prefers Applicant 3 to 4.
The applicant who is rejected in ROUND 1 (4) applies to her second choice:
-Applicant 4 applies to School A.
-School A compares Applicant 1 (retained in round 1) and 4, as it only has one position free; and retains 4 and rejects now 1 (as in School A's preference ordering 4 has priority over 1).
ROUND 3:
The applicant who is rejected in ROUND 2 (1) applies to her second choice:
-Applicant 1 applies to School C.
-School C compares Applicant 3 (retained in round 1) and 1, as it only has one position free. School C retains 1 and rejects now 3 (as in School C's preference ordering 1 has priority over 3).
ROUND 4:
The applicant who is rejected in ROUND 3 (3) applies to her second choice:
-Applicant 3 applies to School B.
-School B retains Applicant 2 since the …rst round, but still has a vacancy (as here there are two positions opening), therefore School B accepts Applicant 3.
Here the process …nishes, as there are no more rejections; and the …nal allocations are: Allocation Method: In this process, initially each participant is tentatively assigned to one of the opening positions and all participants are ordered in a queue based on a fair lottery. This means that each participant has an equal chance of being …rst in the queue, second, . . . , as well as the last in the queue. Given the submitted preference orderings of the participants and the order in the queue determined by the lottery, the allocation process is the following:
An application to the …rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is sent for the participant at the top of the queue.
-If the application is submitted to the school to which this participant was assigned initially, then her tentative assignment becomes her …nal position; and this participant and his position are removed from the subsequent process. The process continues with the next participant in the queue.
-If the application is submitted to another school, say school S, then the …rst participant who tentatively holds a position at school S is moved to the top of the queue, directly in front of the requester.
Whenever the queue is modi…ed, the process continues in the way described above. Now an application to the …rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is sent for the (new) participant at the top of the queue.
-If the application is submitted to the school to which this participant was assigned initially, etc. . .
-If the application is submitted to another school, etc. . .
A mutually-bene…cial exchange is obtained when a cycle of applications is made in sequence, which bene…ts all a¤ected participants; e.g., A applies to B's tentative position, B applies to C's tentative position, and C applies to A's tentative position. In this case the exchange is completed and all three participants as well as their assignments are removed from the subsequent process.
The process continues till all participants are assigned a position.
An Example: (...) Priority queue of applicants: Suppose the lottery gave the following priority ordering: 1 -2 -3 -4.
Tentative assignment: Suppose the initial (tentative) assignment of positions is the following:
Allocation: The allocation method consists of the following process:
Step 1: The …rst applicant in the queue (1) applies to her best choice, to School A, however, the only position here is tentatively held by participant 4. So participant 4 is moved to the top of the queue.
Step 2: The new queue is now 4 -1 -2 -3. Participant 4 ranked School C as her top choice, but the only position of this school is tentatively held by participant 2. Therefore 2 is moved to the top of the queue.
Step 3: The new queue is now 2 -4 -1 -3. Participant 2 ranked School B as her top choice, but the two positions at school B are tentatively held by participant 1 and 3. As 1 has priority over 3 (as she is in front of 3 in the queue), participant 1 is moved to the top of the queue.
Step 4: The new queue is now 1 -2 -4 -3. Remember, that applicant 1 has ranked School A as her best choice. A cycle of participants is now made in sequence in the last three steps: 1 applied to the tentative assignment of 4, 4 applied to the tentative assignment of 2, and 2 applied to the tentative assignment of 1. These mutually bene…ciary changes are made: 1 gets the position in School A, 2 gets one of the two positions in School B, and 4 gets the position in School C. These participants and their assignments are removed from the process.
Step 5: The only participant left to be assigned is 3. As the only school with available position is School B and this position is tentatively assigned to her, it becomes her …nal assignment. The allocation process ends.
The …nal allocations are: ROUND 1: -An application to the …rst ranked school in the Decision Sheet is sent for each participant.
-Each school accepts the participants with higher priority order until positions are …lled. These applicants and their positions are removed from the system. All other applications are rejected by the schools.
ROUND 2:
-The applicants remaining in the system send the application to their second ranked position in the Decision Sheet.
-If a school still has available positions remaining from Round 1, then it accepts the applicant with higher priority order until all positions are …lled. The remaining applications are rejected.
ROUND 3: Each remaining participant is assigned a position at her last choice.
An Example: (...) Submitted school ranking: Suppose the school rankings submitted by each participant are the following: Each applicant applies to her …rst choice:
-Applicants 1, 2, and 3 apply to School A, Applicant 4 to School B.
-School A accepts Applicant 1 (its …rst choice)
-School B accepts Applicant 4
Accepted applicants (1 and 4) and schools without remaining positions (School A) are removed from the subsequent process.
Each applicant who is rejected in ROUND 1 (2 and 3) applies to her second choice:
-Applicants 2 and 3 apply to School C.
-School C accepts Applicant 2 (its …rst choice)
Accepted applicants (2) and schools without remaining positions (School C) are removed from the subsequent process.
ROUND 3:
Each remaining applicant who is rejected in the previous rounds (3) is assigned her last choice:
-Applicant 3 gets the remaining position in School B.
Based on this method, the …nal allocations are: This means, that if at the end of the experiment you hold a position:
-at school A, you will be paid 9 ECU;
-at school B, you will be paid 15 ECU;
-at school C, you will be paid 3 ECU.
Recall: Di¤erent participants might have di¤erent payo¤ tables.
Recall: There are two positions opening at schools A and B, and one at school C.
Priority ordering of schools: You have no information about the preferences of the schools. This means, that if at the end of the experiment you hold a position:
Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your …rst choice to your last choice. Please rank EVERY school! 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice This is the end of the experiment. Please wait until everybody …nishes and you are told your result. This means, that if at the end of the experiment you hold a position:
Decision Sheet for GS
-participant 1 and participant 5 hold a position at school A, participant 3 and 4 hold a position at school B, and you hold a position at school C, the payo¤s would be the following:
-participant 1 would be paid 3 ECU; participant 5 would get 15 ECU; participant 3 would get 3 ECU; participant 4 would get 3 ECU; and you would get 3 ECU.
Priority ordering of the schools: The complete priority ordering of the schools is known by each participant, and is shown in the following Please submit your ranking of the schools (A through C) from your …rst choice to your last choice. Please rank EVERY school! 
